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Resumen
Este trabajo evalúa la eficiencia del esquema de metas de inflación actualmente vigente en el Banco
Central de Chile. Usando un pequeño modelo macroeconómico de la economía chilena, nuestros
principales resultados son los siguientes: (i) una política monetaria eficiente requiere un sesgo hacia
la estabilización del producto alrededor de su tendencia de largo plazo; (ii) el cambio hacia una
meta para la proyección de la inflación, implícito en el actual esquema para el uso de metas de
inflación en Chile, resulta en una ganancia de eficiencia; (iii) tener como objetivo la inflación
subyacente no es eficiente; ( iv) ceteris  paribus, la eficiencia podría ser mejorada si la política
monetaria tiene elasticidad negativa respecto a shocks al costo de financiamiento internacional.
Abstract
This paper assesses the efficiency of the current Inflation Targeting (IT) scheme in place at the
Central Bank of Chile. Using a small macroeconomic model of the Chilean economy, our main
results are as follows: (i) an efficient monetary policy requires a bias towards output stabilization
around its long run trend; (ii) the switch to forecast-targeting, implicit in the current IT scheme in
Chile, results in an efficiency gain; (iii) targeting core inflation is not efficient; (iv) ceteris paribus,
efficiency could be enhanced if monetary policy leans against the wind when facing shocks to the
cost of international finance.
____________________
This paper is a chapter of the forthcoming book Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, Challenges, edited
by Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto, Santiago, Chile. © 2002 Central Bank of Chile.
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Inflation targeting can be broadly defined as a framework for the
conduct of monetary policy, in which the central bank guides its in-
struments in order to hold inflation near a preannounced target or to
bring back to the target.1 Although understanding the framework is
straightforward, its practical implementation is not. In the real world,
central bankers can practice only a rough version of the Tinbergen-
Theil  targets-and-instruments approach to economic policy. Knowl-
edge of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (magnitudes and
lags) is imperfect, achieving consensus on any moment of the probabil-
ity distribution of exogenous variables is very difficult, and there is no
single objective function in society or even at the central bank for au-
thorities to optimize. However, autonomous central banks must make
decisions based on this imperfect set of information and then convinc-
ingly explain the rationale for those measures to financial markets,
the legislature, and the general public.
This paper focuses on some of the practicalities of implementing
inflation targets, using empirical evidence for Chile. The goal is to find
evidence on which type of monetary policy rule is likely to be efficient
We thank Rómulo Chumacero for insightful comments and Leonardo Luna
for his outstanding assistance and dedication.
1. The framework usually includes other ingredients such as a strong com-
mitment to the primary objective of controlling inflation, an increase in transpar-
ency and accountability, direct and abundant communication with the public, and
reliance on a broad set of indicators.2 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
in Chile when used as a guideline for monetary policy. Several issues
are relevant. Should monetary policy react to unemployment or the
output gap in this framework? If so, how much should it react? Should
it focus on current headline inflation, core inflation, or a forecast of
either one? If a forecast, over what horizon? Should the Central Bank
tighten monetary policy when faced with a hike in oil prices? Should it
track changes in the international interest rate and the sovereign risk
premium, or should it lean against them? What should be the role of
the exchange rate in the monetary policy rule? All of these questions
have arisen at one point or another in the implementation of inflation
targeting in Chile, and none can be answered without a specific model
that describes the mechanics of the economy.
To analyze these issues, we construct a small macroeconometric
model of the Chilean economy, which allows us to calculate the perfor-
mance of alternative monetary policy rules through stochastic simula-
tion. We use these simulations to calculate the levels of volatility of
both inflation and output that result from a series of alternative mon-
etary policy rules, given a fixed distribution for exogenous shocks. On
the basis of these volatilities, it is possible to assess, for instance, whether
monetary policy gains in efficiency by reacting to the output gap even
when inflation is the central bank’s sole objective.
We use these same volatilities to calculate the envelope of efficiency
frontiers for different families of policy rules and to evaluate whether it
is possible to gain efficiency through simple changes in the monetary
policy reaction function, regardless of preferences on the volatility and
persistence of inflation and output levels or the degree of activism asso-
ciated with the policy. In particular, we evaluate whether it is conve-
nient to react to core instead of headline inflation, to react to inflation
forecasts instead of actual inflation, or to include the cost of interna-
tional finance (both the sovereign spread and the relevant interest rate).
This exercise parallels similar studies undertaken for other coun-
tries that target inflation.2 All of these studies evaluate the efficiency of
simple monetary policy rules in the context of specific models and check
their robustness across different models (Levin, Wieland, and Williams,
1999). In some respects, our results parallel those found for industrial
countries. However, verifying the robustness of simple monetary policy
rules in Chile requires paying special attention to specific features of
the Chilean economy, such as the degree of economic openness, the
volatility of supply shocks, and the extent of price and wage indexation.
2. For example, see Rudebusch and Svensson (1999); Batini and Haldane (1999).3 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
Some related research for the case of Chile can be found in Valdés
and Medina (2000a, 2000b). Some important differences must be em-
phasized, however. First, the search for optimal, as opposed to effi-
cient, rules hinges on the definition of the appropriate loss function to
be maximized. This is a particularly difficult issue to settle within cen-
tral banks. Second, focusing on the efficiency of different rules shifts
the focus from preferences to outcomes. For example, including the
output gap in the central bank’s loss function goes against many pre-
conceived notions of how an autonomous monetary policy should be
conducted. Including the output gap in the policy rule is much less
debatable, however, due to the impact of aggregate demand conditions
on inflationary pressures.
The macroeconometric model we use in this paper is a simple open-
economy, IS-LM-AS model with rational expectations. It is simple
enough to allow us to track the key parameters that influence some of
the results. The model comprises five main equations: an output equa-
tion; a forward-looking long-term interest rate; an exchange rate equa-
tion based on uncovered interest rate parity; a forward-looking
accelerationist Phillips curve for core inflation; and a monetary policy
rule. The model also includes some simple pricing rules for noncore
items in the consumer price index (CPI), such as fuels and perishables.
Uncertainty takes into account both equation innovations and innova-
tions in exogenous variables such as world output, international inter-
est rates, sovereign spreads, terms of trade, oil prices, and fiscal policy.
By construction, the model assumes perfect credibility in that it
includes rational expectations and a known monetary policy rule. It
therefore cannot address issues such as lack of confidence in macroeco-
nomic management. In our opinion, however, this limitation is rel-
evant only when inflation is converging toward a steady-state level,
and not when it is at its steady-state level. Indeed, discussing whether
monetary policy should react to core or headline inflation is essentially
irrelevant when the inflation targeting framework is on a converging
path. In that case, credibility issues take precedence. The contrary
happens when inflation has already converged to its steady-state level.
A second caveat is that the model used to carry this exercise grants us
only partial immunity from the Lucas critique. It includes an explicit
expectations component in the inflation, exchange rate, and interest
rate equations. Some parameters, however, such as the degree of in-
dexation, the backward-looking component in the price equation, and
the dynamics of the exchange rate pass-through, may also depend on
the monetary policy framework.4 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model
we use. Section 2 discusses the comparative efficiency of some proto-
typical monetary policy rules. This section then generalizes the analysis
to a fuller set of parameters for defining each monetary policy rule,
and it evaluates whether focusing on headline, forecast, or core infla-
tion yields better results and whether reactions to international in-
terest rates improve monetary policy efficiency. The final section pre-
sents the main conclusions and directions for future work.
1. A SMALL MACROECONOMIC MODEL FOR THE CHILEAN
ECONOMY
This paper relies on a small macroeconometric model along the
lines of an open-economy, IS-LM-AS model with rational expectations.
As such, the model shares many of the strengths and pitfalls of short-
term, aggregate-demand-driven models. It centers on empirically based
equations that are not explicitly derived from first principles. Recent
research on dynamic neo-Keynesian (DNK) models shows, however,
that the version of the IS-LM-AS model that results from combining
an intertemporal Euler equation for aggregate demand with the new
Phillips curve effectively embeds Calvo-style price setting and ratio-
nal expectations.3
The model abstracts from many of the transmission channels of
monetary policy, but it emphasizes three areas: the effect of monetary
policy on the level and structure of market interest rates and its sub-
sequent impact on aggregate demand pressures and inflation; the role
of exchange rate dynamics in imported inflation; and expectations
with regard to asset prices and inflation. The model excludes other
channels of monetary policy, most notably the impact on credit and
money markets. Similarly, it does not consider the effect of monetary
policy on asset prices other that the exchange rate and long-term bonds.
This leaves an important area for future research. The role of the
credit channel in an open economy, in particular, requires further
analysis. The recent international financial crises highlight the im-
portance of these transmission channels, including the balance sheet
effect. Although the discipline has made theoretical progress on these
issues,  there is still a clear need for an adequate empirical counter-
part for policy evaluation.
3. For example Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999).5 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
1.1 Basic Structure4
The output equation (the IS curve) relates the difference between
quarterly growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and its trend to the
deviations from steady state of a set of domestic and external vari-
ables. The domestic variables include real interest rates (both short r
and long R), the real exchange rate, e, fiscal policy, f, and the lagged
output gap. The external variables consist of international real inter-
est rates adjusted for Chile’s sovereign spread, r*, the growth of the
terms of trade, tt, and GDP growth of Chile’s five main trading part-
ners, y*. In the following equation, all variables are in logs; overbars
indicate trend or equilibrium values. The specific lag structure (not
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LM serial correlation test: F = 0.094 (p-value 0.984)
Estimation period: 1987:1–2001:2
Several modeling assumptions are noteworthy. First, the level of
real interest rates (short, long, and foreign) affects the rate of change of
output. At first glance, this is conceptually similar to the dynamic neo-
Keynesian version of an IS curve, but we do not include the expected
output level on the right-hand side (doing so would be theoretically
consistent with a Euler equation).
Second, the real exchange rate misalignment (instead of its rate of
change) has an impact on growth. This implies that the exchange rate
has an expansionary impact on aggregate demand when it is above its
equilibrium or fundamental value (that is, when it is overdepreciated).
4. The ecuations shown below are estimates of the corresponding equations.
The specific parameters used for calibration are available upon request.6 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
Third, the current cyclical position acts as either a brake or an
accelerator: growth is higher when the economy is recovering from a
downturn. This allows for mean reversion in growth rates toward full
employment, assuming that output is not a unit root. Although the
coefficient on this term in the equation is imprecisely estimated, we
impose mean reversion. Otherwise, monetary policy would have per-
manent effects on the economy.5
Fourth, although capital flows are not modeled, the international
interest rate has a very strong effect. This can be interpreted either as
a proxy for capital inflows and outflows or as a reflection of a segmented
market for investment finance, in which larger firms tap the dollar-
denominated international bond markets while smaller firms are re-
stricted to domestic financing.
Fifth, the equation shows negative autocorrelation, which implies
that output overshoots policy shifts in the short term. The trend effects
are around half the instantaneous impact. This is a feature of using
first differences of output as the dependent variable. Indeed, annual
rates of change tend to exhibit positive serial correlation, which ob-
scures short-term dynamics.
As mentioned above, the model does not focus on money demand as
an important transmission channel. Thus, instead of having an LM
block, the model includes a relation between short- and long-term real
rates that is determined by a variant of the rational expectations hy-
pothesis, as in Herrera and Magendzo.6 The exclusion of the LM curve
is not a substantial deviation from traditional Keynesian modeling.7
The relationship implies that current long-term rates provide informa-
tion about the future path of short-term rates. There is widespread
evidence, however, on the failure of the yield-curve hypothesis in its
simplest form. This failure is reflected by the existence of a risk pre-
mium (or maturity premium) that affects the slope of the yield curve,
which can also be autocorrelated.8 The autocorrelation is probably due
to the lack of liquidity in Chile’s financial markets.
In practice, the model assumes an exogenously given maturity pre-
mium, relating short- and long-term rates in equilibrium: Rr =+ ζ .
5. Chumacero (2000) shows strong evidence against a unit root in output for
the case of Chile.
6. Herrera and Magendzo (1997).
7. Romer (2000) shows how one can have a model without the LM curve, but
with a policy rule. This is precisely the kind of framework that we follow.
8. For evidence for the Chilean economy, see Fernández (2000).7 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
The dynamics of long-term rates are given by the following equation,
with parameters obtained through instrumental variables estimation:
11 0.28( ) 0.60( ) 0.03( )
(5.50) (12.49) (2.24)
R R RR RR r r −+ =+ − + − + −
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Hence, leads and lags of the long-term rate, as well as the mon-
etary policy stance, determine long-term rates. On solving this equa-
tion forward, and assuming that R(–1) = R, we find that the current
deviation of the long-term rate from its steady-state value reflects the
discounted sum of expected future deviations of the policy stance from
its neutral position. In the short run, the interest rate dynamics dis-
play some degree of inertia.
Even in the long run, exchange rates can deviate substantially from
purchasing power parity. Moreover, uncovered interest rate parity fails
miserably at tracking the dynamics of monetary policy and exchange
rates in the short run. This poses a challenge for exchange rate model-
ing. We take a pragmatic approach, allowing convergence of the real
exchange rate to its long-run equilibrium while at the same time incor-
porating overshooting dynamics and some inertia:
*
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LM serial correlation test (4 lags): F = 1.098 (p-value 0.367)
Estimation period: 1986:2–2001:2
Assuming e = e(–1), this equation demonstrates that the current
deviation of the real exchange rate from its fundamental or long-run8 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
value is equal to the discounted sum of expected real interest rate dif-
ferentials. In the short run, however, a degree of inertia affects the
dynamic adjustment.
The model determines core CPI inflation, π x, through an
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LM serial correlation test: N R
2 = 5.705 (p-value 0.222)
Estimation period: 1986:4–2001:2
Core inflation is thus related to its own lags and leads, and im-
ported inflation is given by the sum of nominal exchange rate devalua-
tion and foreign (dollar) inflation. The equation is homogeneous to the
first degree in these determinants, reflecting long-term neutrality.
Two other factors influence core CPI inflation. One is the output
gap. This is obviously a reduced form, whereas a more general frame-
work would include wage setting and unemployment as determinants. A
positive output gap tends to accelerate inflation, and the coefficient might
very well depend on the level of inflation itself. The slope of the Phillips
curve thus changes with disinflation. The coefficient shown in the equa-
tion is consistent with the current level of inflation in Chile. The output
gap’s impact on inflation could also be affected by the existence of speed
limits, which implies a convex Phillips curve. That is, if the output gap
rises above a certain threshold, inflation shoots up at a much faster rate.
Conversely, it is hard to deflate below a certain negative output gap.
The second factor is the gap between headline and core inflation.
Direct indexation of core inflation is already reflected through the inclu-
sion of a lag. In Chile, however, prices such as wages and housing rents
are  commonly indexed to headline inflation. Noncore CPI shocks are
likely to feed back into core inflation through this indexation process.
The model takes an ad hoc approach to markups, assuming that
they are a constant fraction of total costs.9 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
Noncore CPI items include products such as fuels, regulated ser-
vices, and perishables, which follow simple price-setting rules. In the
case of fuels, for example, these take the form of the law of one price
for long-run prices. The short-term dynamics, on the other hand, are
calibrated through an error correction model, based on exploratory
regressions. A similar approach is used with regulated services and
utilities, which depend on fuel prices as well as the exchange rate.
For perishables, we assume a constant growth rate of 3 percent to
allow for transitory deviations along the lines of an error correction
mechanism, as in the case of fuels.
To close the model, we specify the conduct of the central bank in
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This rule is general enough to allow for a wide choice of parameters
for determining monetary policy reactions. It accommodates different
degrees of anti-inflationary zeal, for example, which is captured by the
parameter 0 < γ  < 1, and varying levels of activism, given by θ  > 0.
The latter indicates the size of the interest rate reaction to weighted
deviations of output and inflation from their targets, while the former
represents the relative weight of inflation in the monetary policy rule.
This does not necessarily imply that output per se is an argument in
the central bank’s implicit loss function. However, it is consistent with
the case in which the central bank either targets full employment or is
concerned about the volatility of output around this long-run trend. A
very different set of issues arises if the central bank targets a level of
output that is inconsistent with full employment.
This rule also encompasses different horizons, τ , for evaluating
whether inflation is on target. Although the inflation target itself is
defined in terms of headline inflation, this rule allows for the use of a
weighted average of core and headline inflation (given by 0 < λ  < 1) to
determine the reaction of monetary policy.
Monetary policy is also allowed to respond to international inter-
est rates (adjusted for risk premium), thereby possibly smoothing
the inflationary or deflationary impact of this variable. Two forces
are at play in a framework of floating exchange rates. On the one
hand,  movements in international interest rates tend to affect the
exchange rate in the short run and also possibly in the long run. On10 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
the other hand, international interest rates have a strong effect on
domestic activity, which operates in the opposite direction in terms
of inflationary consequences. It is not easy, therefore, to pinpoint
the sign of η  in advance.
Finally, the persistence of the policy stance is measured by 0 < ρ  < 1:
if ρ  = 0, then deviations of the policy interest rate  from a neutral stance
are completely transient in nature; if ρ  = 1, then changes in the policy
stance are fully persistent, and monetary policy does not revert to its
neutral state.
1.2 Five Families of Policy Rules
The database and model are calibrated to yield a steady-state path
for all the variables, which are broadly defined to conform with the
current macroeconomic situation in Chile. We further define five fami-
lies of policy rules to reflect whether monetary policy targets core or
headline inflation, whether it focuses on current or forecast deviations
from the target, and whether it shadows international interest rates.
In terms of the notation of the model above, these cases are as follows:
Current headline targeting (CH),
44 1 () ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) rr yy r r − −= θ γ π − π+− γ − + ρ −   ;
Current core targeting (CC),
44 1 () ( 1 ) ( ) ( )
x rr yy r r −  −= θ γ π − π+− γ − + ρ −  ;
Forecast headline targeting (FH),
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9. In total, we conducted 2,325 stochastic simulations.
Thus splitting the parameter space, which encompasses all the
monetary policy rules, breaks the problem down into smaller bits. It
then becomes possible to ask which of these five families leads to a
more efficient monetary policy, independently of the degree of persis-
tence, activism, or inflationary zeal that the policymaker might choose.
We start by examining how specific examples of these monetary policy
rules illustrate most of the more generic results found above.
2. THE EFFICIENCY OF DIFFERENT MONETARY POLICY RULES
This section focuses on the trade-offs between output and inflation
volatility. We proceed by fixing two of the three parameters (θ , γ , and ρ )
and varying the third, and we then compare the resulting trade-offs
between rules. Because the results may be sensitive to the choice of per-
sistence, activism, and inflationary bias in each simulation, we construct
efficiency frontiers (that is, the envelope of the variance trade-offs) through
extensive stochastic simulations of the macroeconomic model described
above, incorporating a wider set of parameters than that used in the
simulations in the previous section.9 Most of the results of the paper,
however, are apparent from the first, simpler exercise.
On the basis of this analysis, we derive three main results. First,
biasing monetary policy responses toward output stabilization is effi-
cient. Second, while it is inefficient to target core inflation, targeting
forecast headline inflation does improve efficiency. Finally, leaning
against movements in the cost of international finance can be efficient.
2.1 Output Stabilization
The different exercises consistently show that achieving an effi-
cient trade-off between inflation and output volatility requires heavily
weighting output stabilization. In terms of our policy rule, there is a
threshold value for γ , the anti-inflationary zeal of monetary policy, above
which the volatility of both output and inflation increases. The reason
for this is straightforward and is widely documented in the literature
on Taylor rules: given the importance of the output gap in accelerating
inflation, stabilizing output directly stabilizes inflation. Figure 1 shows
a typical backward-bending trade-off given current headline targeting,
in which ρ  = 0.4 and θ  = 40.12 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
Thus the first feature of this particular monetary policy rule is
that at some point, increasing the weight on inflation increases the
volatility of both output and inflation. For some value of γ *, lower weights
on inflation increase the trade-off between output volatility and infla-
tion volatility.
A second feature of this monetary policy rule is that the cost, in
terms of output volatility, of putting some weight on inflation seems
rather small, while the gain in reduced inflation volatility is large.
This occurs because weighting inflation reduces the volatility of the
nominal exchange rate.
The efficiency of a biased weight on output stabilization can be veri-
fied through an analysis of other relevant trade-offs. Most notably,
monetary policy can be more or less aggressive, which in the model is
captured by the size of θ . A large θ   implies that monetary policy reacts
strongly to the weighted deviations of output and inflation. Figure 2
shows the output-inflation trade-offs associated with different levels of
activism, based on three different values of γ . If all weight is put on
output stabilization, that is, if γ  = 0, the threshold that output and
Figure 1. The Trade-off under Contemporaneous Headline
Targeting (θ  = 40, ρ  = 0.4)
Source: Authors’ calculations.13 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
inflation volatility cannot breach falls. Thus, no matter how aggres-
sive monetary policy is, it produces little gain in reduced inflation and
output volatility if it only reacts to output. More can be achieved if
some weight is put on inflation. Inflation volatility can be reduced by a
more aggressive monetary policy, albeit at a cost in terms of output
volatility; this case is plotted in the figure as γ  = 0.5.
The case that highlights the efficiency of putting some weight on
output stabilization is shown by the trade-off that exists when γ  = 1. A
soft stance on inflation is clearly the best approach under this mon-
etary policy rule: reduced inflation and output volatility can be achieved
if a positive weight is put on output stabilization. In addition, increased
activism runs into the backward-bending part of the trade-off sooner
than does a more neutral course. Thus, this hawkish monetary policy
is not only dominated by a more dovish approach, but also restricts the
degree of activism that monetary policy might pursue.
A more general way of looking at this issue involves examining the
distribution of the threshold inflationary bias over which monetary
policy becomes ineffective. This corresponds to γ * in figure 1. Given a
particular parameterization of the policy rule, if γ  > γ * the variance
Figure 2. Policy Rules under Contemporaneous Headline
Targeting
Source: Authors’ calculations.14 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
trade-off has a positive slope, and efficiency can be enhanced by putting
less weight on inflation. Figure 3 shows numerical approximations of
the distribution of γ *. The approximate distribution is similar across
families of policy rules, which shows that γ * is sensitive mostly to the
choice of persistence and activism in the rule. The mode of these distri-
butions is close to 0.8, with a lower bound around 0.4. This shows that
a robust policy rule—that is, a rule that is always efficient, regardless
of the choice of its parameterization—implies no more than a 40 per-
cent weight on inflation deviations and a corresponding 60 percent weight
on stabilizing the output gap.
2.2 Targeting Forecast Headline Inflation
Chile’s adoption of a formal inflation targeting scheme in Septem-
ber 1999 has not been without some degree of confusion regarding the
specific target. Although the objective of price stability is defined in
terms of headline inflation, the Central Bank has explicitly focused on
the evolution of core inflation. Some observers have therefore concluded
that the target was defined in terms of core inflation. This is not a far-
fetched deduction: many central banks that target inflation explicitly
Figure 3. Kernel Approximations for the Distribution of γ *
Source: Authors’ calculations.15 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
define their target in terms of core inflation. The rationale for such a
decision lies in the convenience of not overreacting to price shocks that
a priori have no bearing on the permanent inflationary path. Moreover,
the contractionary effect of large supply shocks might require a more
flexible monetary stance.
The key element in this respect is the likelihood that price shocks
that are unrelated to the underlying supply and demand conditions in
the economy might feed back into inflation expectations and wage and
price indexation. Automatic indexation clauses are widespread in the
Chilean economy because of the country’s long history of high, variable
inflation. Furthermore, backward-looking price setting behavior is preva-
lent among both firms and workers. Targeting core inflation would
thus be a dangerous proposition in terms of efficiency, at least in the
case of Chile. Our results confirm this finding. Figure 4 shows that
targeting current headline inflation (CH) produces a better result than
targeting current core inflation (CC) when θ  = 40 and ρ  = 0.4. Focus-
ing on headline targeting is therefore the correct approach for stabiliz-
ing output and inflation. As expected, the differences between target-
Figure 4. Policy Rules under Contemporaneous Core
Targeting and Forecast Headline Targeting (θ  = 40, ρ  = 0.4)
Source: Authors’ calculations.16 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
ing headline versus core inflation and are small when the weight on
the output gap is large.
Noncore inflation shocks do not necessarily imply acceleration in
core inflation, however. The new inflation targeting scheme in place at
the Central Bank of Chile addresses this fact by setting the monetary
policy stance such that forecast inflation is within the 2 to 4 percent
range. As figure 4 shows, targeting forecast headline inflation (FH) is
preferable to targeting current headline inflation.
Our research does not tackle a number of interesting issues, such
as the appropriate time horizon for the forecast.10 We took a conserva-
tive approach in using five quarters ahead. This seems like a reason-
able assumption since the typical lag between the monetary policy de-
cisions and inflation is around four quarters. However, forecast devia-
tions of output from trend can be included in the monetary policy rule.
This probably enhances the policy’s efficiency, given the three-quarter
lag with which monetary policy affects output.
Some researchers stress a downside of using forecast inflation in
setting policy rules, mainly arguing that this type of policy can gen-
erate inflation indeterminacy.11 This is indeed the case if the argu-
ment in the policy rule is, for example, annual inflation two years
from now. We avoid this problem by setting the argument in the rule
as average annual inflation throughout the forecast horizon. The price
level is then safely anchored in known information, thereby avoiding
such indeterminacy.
Again, the differences between targeting current core versus cur-
rent headline inflation are small when the weight on the output gap is
large. These results are robust to different parameterizations. Figure 5
shows the efficiency frontiers for a broad set of activism, anti-inflation-
ary zeal, and persistence of monetary policy. CC is always less efficient
than CH, while FH is more efficient than both. The differences are
small when monetary policy chooses a low degree of output volatility.
2.3 Leaning against Movements in International Rates
Under fixed exchange rates, domestic interest rates must shadow
the developments in international interest rates. This can be an auto-
matic reaction, as in the case of a currency board, or a policy option, as
in the case of a relatively loose peg. The implied loss of an autonomous
10. For example, see Cunningham and Haldane (2002).
11. See, for example, Wieland (2000).17 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
monetary policy is one of the arguments advanced for establishing a
flexible arrangement. The Chilean peso currently floats freely. In terms
of the model, the exchange rate is determined by a simple variant of
uncovered interest rate parity. The relevant policy question is whether
monetary policy should track changes in the cost of international fi-
nance or lean against them. What should be the role of the exchange
rate in the monetary policy rule?
A simple way of tackling these issues is by examining how the
output-inflation variance trade-off changes when monetary policy is
allowed to respond to deviations of the international interest rate from
its long-run level. We compare these trade-offs for particular cases of
the monetary policy families FH, FH+, and FH–. The resulting curves
are shown in figure 6.
In this particular case, leaning against the trend appears to be the
efficient monetary policy response to international interest rates. This
result stems from the particular assumptions in the model used for the
simulations. The inflationary effect of international interest rate shocks
Figure 5. Efficiency Frontiers under Contemporaneous
Headline Targeting, Contemporaneous Core Targeting, and
Forecast Headline Targeting
Source: Authors’ calculations.18 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
works through two channels. The direct effect on exchange rates is
small, given that the equilibrium real exchange rate is independent of
international interest rates. In contrast, the indirect effect on the out-
put gap is large. Indeed, international real interest rates have a larger
effect on growth than domestic real interest rates.
On balance, therefore, the impact of an increase in international
interest rates is deflationary. The efficient response thus involves a re-
duction in domestic interest rates, which is captured by the FH– policy
rule. This is robust to different parameterizations, as the efficiency
frontiers in figure 7 show. The particular set of assumptions that feed
the model drive this result. The key assumption here is the zero corre-
lation between the equilibrium real exchange rate and international
interest rates. Relaxing this assumption (for example, by defining the
accumulation of net foreign assets as an endogenous variable) would
imply that international interest rates have income and wealth effects,
and it would generate movements in equilibrium real exchange rates.
In this alternative environment, the direct inflationary impact of in-
ternational interest rates would be magnified.
Figure 6. Policy Rules under Forecast Headline Targeting
with Shadowing (θ  = 50, ρ  = 0.4)
Source: Authors’ calculations.19 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
Figure 7. Efficiency Frontiers under Forecast Headline
Targeting with Shadowing
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The model assumes perfect credibility in that it includes rational
expectations and a known monetary policy rule. It therefore cannot
address issues such as lack of confidence, which can be a key factor in
emerging economies that have weak links to international financial
markets. The credibility problem may be exacerbated if monetary policy
follows some type of exchange rate targeting. In that case, the cred-
ibility of the exchange rate commitment becomes the cornerstone of
monetary policy. The framework used in this paper for analyzing
monetary policy issues is of little value in such a setting.
These results stem from exogenous movements in the cost of
international credit, such as those associated with higher sovereign
spreads stemming from contagion effects. They would not apply in a
more realistic environment in which international interest rates re-
act to shifts in world GDP growth. If the latter effect more than
compensates the movements in international interest rates, positive
shadowing might be the efficient response to changes in the world
environment.20 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
3. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The main results of this work shed some light on the efficient con-
duct of monetary policy. First, given that the output gap is a main
determinant of inflationary pressures, output stabilization can prevent
persistent and volatile deviations of inflation from its target. Moreover,
putting too much weight on inflation can actually produce increases in
the volatility of both output and inflation itself. A bias toward output
stabilization thus offers a robust way to ensure efficiency. The actual
weight on the output gap employed in the policy rule, over and above
the degree that ensures efficiency, depends on the preferences and ob-
jectives of the central bank.
The second result relates to how the central bank should react to
possibly permanent supply shocks. One option is to focus on core CPI,
that is, on the price measure that excludes the components driving
supply shocks in general, such as fuels or perishables. This response
does not seem appropriate for the Chilean economy, given the structure
of the model. Specifically, the existence of automatic indexation clauses
that tie individual prices to headline CPI introduces a high degree of
inflationary volatility and persistence if monetary policy simply does
not respond to these supply shocks. The second, and better, alternative
is to respond to deviations in forecast inflation from the target. This
allows the central bank to focus on the actual persistence of headline
inflation and thereby avoid overreacting to short-term fluctuations,
which actually increases volatility.
Finally, the model indicates that given the high real effects of move-
ments in the international cost of credit, monetary policy could im-
prove efficiency by leaning against those movements.
A matter that remains unresolved, and that is not addressed in the
body of the paper, is that in a steady state, σ π  is very large in all cases.
This is not consistent with Chile’s current inflation target of 2 to 4 per-
cent, which the Central Bank established as its definition of price stabil-
ity. What are the possible reasons for this apparent puzzle? First, the
model assumes a historical degree of credibility, although it is more likely
that the credibility of monetary policy is higher today than in the past,
due to the successful disinflation of the 1990s and the absence of a
political business cycle in 1998–99. This enhanced credibility allows a
more active role for markups in absorbing temporary relative price
shocks, as well as accommodating exchange rate movements. The lat-
ter results in a lower pass-through, which has been a surprising fea-
ture of the last few years in Chile. Increased credibility might also21 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
encourage lower wage indexation, with a higher weight of the inflation
target in the formation of inflation expectations.
Second, the model might be underestimating the effect of the out-
put gap on inflation. Although the output gap parameter is estimated
in the Phillips curve to account for trend disinflation in the 1990s,
other factors, such as increased competition in goods markets, have
increased the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap. A third possibil-
ity is that noncore CPI components will be less volatile in the future
than in the past.
This puzzle poses several fundamental questions, which can serve
as a guide for future research: Has the new inflation targeting frame-
work in place in Chile caused a structural shift? If so, to what degree?
What is the relation between the credibility of monetary policy and its
efficient response to movements in the international cost of credit? What
role do other transmission channels play? These issues set the agenda
for extending the work on model development and the transmission
mechanism at the Central Bank of Chile.22 Pablo S. García, Luis Óscar Herrera, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
APPENDIX
Variables Used
y :Seasonally adjusted log gross domestic product, excluding fisheries,
mining and energy
y :Trend GDP, constructed with the HP filter
r :Monetary policy rate: Interbank rate 1995–2001; yield on 90 day
index bond 1986–1994.
R :Long term interest rate: yield on indexed bond (8 year 1992 onwards,
extrapolated with other long term bonds before that)
f :Fiscal impulse (see Monetary Policy Report May 2000)
* r :Real foreign interest rate:180 day libor, adjusted for sovereign
spread (official series 1999 onwards, short term spread in Chapter
XIV credits before), tax on capital inflows, US core inflation.
* y :Trade weighted GDP of US, Japan, Eurozone, Argentina and Japan
e :Multilateral real exchange rate
ε :Multilateral nominal exchange rate
π :Headline CPI inflation
x π :Underlying CPI inflation: headline minus perishables, fuel prices
and regulated services
* π :Dollar trade-weighted world inflation
Overbars in variables reflect steady state assumptions, which are
not relevant for the stochastic simulation results presented in the paper.23 New Frontiers for Monetary Policy in Chile
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